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Resource Conflict in the Columbia Basin 
The Columbia, one of the world's great rivers, has provided human societies with 
an abundance of resources for centuries. The river basin stretches over parts of seven 
states and the province of British Columbia, draining an area of several hundred thousand 
square miles. The river provides fisheries and serves as a water highway linking the 
inland northwest to the Pacific. With the construction of dams beginning in the 1930's, 
the Columbia developed into the region's primary source of energy, and currently 
provides 74% of the region's generating capacity (U.S. Department of Energy 1995c, 2-
5). This surfeit of electricity attracted power-intensive industry such as aluminum 
smelters, and led to the promotion of electricity for space heating and other household 
and commercial applications. The dams have also assisted navigation, provided water for 
irrigation, created recreational opportunities, and controlled the flooding that was once a 
violent annual occurrence throughout the region. 
This history of resource abundance has not promoted efficient use of the basin's 
resources. Only as electricity demand began to exceed hydropower capacity and fish runs 
began a rapid decline were concerns about conservation and efficient use of resources 
raised as an urgent matter of public business. Fisheries managers had warned for decades 
that the long-term impact of dams on salmon could be catastrophic, but the concern was 
little heeded until recently. Only with hindsight have people begun to ask whether all of 
the dams should have been built, or whether the huge irrigation projects really do make 
economic sense. The system of dams is not about to be dismantled, but many questions 
are being raised about how the river might be managed more efficiently in a manner 
consistent with the biological needs of salmon and other species. 
There are two primary problems driving debate over Columbia River 
management. The first is the condition of the historically abundant runs of the various 
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species of salmon. Once, annual runs numbered between eight and 16 million. The 1993 
total was 950,000, of which about 240,000 were wild fish (U.S. Department of Energy 
1995a, 2-10). Even that decline hides the range of impacts on the various different 
species and subspecies, some of which are extinct and others which are well on their way. 
Three species of salmon in the Snake River Basin have been listed as endangered. The 
presence of numerous hatchery fish in the run totals above has given rise to another 
controversy, namely, whether to try to save wild runs or simply be content to gradually 
replace the wild fish with hatchery bred. Because wild fish tend to be much hardier than 
hatchery and breeding programs depend on infusions of wild stock to renew the gene 
pools, maintaining wild stocks is an important goal even apart from the cultural 
centrality, emotional symbolism, and aesthetic appeal of the wild fish (National Research 
Council 1995). 
The second problem, which has run headlong into the first, is the financial 
condition of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the federal agency charged 
with marketing the power produced by the federal dams on the Columbia. The BP A has 
come under pressure from four sources. First, a number of fiscally conservative 
politicians have for the last decade or more been calling for Bonneville to increase its 
debt payments to the federal government. Some have suggested that the power system 
should be sold off to private investors (MacKenzie l 995c ). Second, BP A faces a seven 
billion dollar debt incurred from the sale of bonds used to finance the construction of 
nuclear power plants that, except for one, were never completed. Although the public 
utilities involved in the project defaulted on the bonds and were thus able to cut their 
losses, Bonneville is prevented from doing so by its status as a federal agency. Together, 
these two liabilities cast a long shadow over BPA's finances (Northwest Power Planning 
Council 1995). 
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Recent developments in the electric industry have also undermined Bonneville's 
competitive position (MacKenzie 1995a). New sources of electricity have come available 
that are competitive with the cost ofhydropower, at least the cost after BPA's liabilities 
have been covered. Cheap electricity has also been available from California, stimulated 
by the surplus of production capacity and that state's prolonged recession. Given these 
developments, some of BP A's customers have been leaving, or at least threatening to 
leave, the fold. They have either sought greener pastures or have used market conditions 
to gain rate concessions. 
To all of the above is then added BP A's liability for mitigating damage done to 
wildlife (including salmon) by the federal dams. BP A's annual cost for salmon 
restoration is approximately $435 million, varying from $250 to $700 million depending 
on the abundance of water in a particular year (Northwest Power Planning Council 1995, 
11 ). Much of the cost of these measures is foregone revenue from generating capacity 
that is lost when water is released to flush juvenile salmon to the Pacific. The mounting 
cost of salmon restoration, combined with other financial pressures, has made it 
increasingly difficult for Bonneville to remain competitive in the market and meet its 
financial obligations. This situation has led some observers to conclude that BP A is 
caught in a death spiral. Although Bonneville negotiated an agreement in 1995 to cap its 
fish and wildlife expenditures, the issue of future liability is still an open question 
(Harrison 1996). 
Changes in the electricity industry are also driving debate about the future of BP A 
and the structure of the northwest power system. A comprehensive review of the system 
was initiated by governors of the northwest states and is considering the place of BP A in 
a competitive industry (Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System 1996). 
The review will also consider how best to provide for the public purposes, including 
salmon and wildlife programs, that BP A has served in the past. 
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In the face of such changes and pressures, all of the activities on the river are 
being reexamined. All uses of the river, however, are not equally subject to change. In 
particular, the allocation and use of water for irrigation has been insulated from change, 
both in the Columbia Basin and throughout the west. The historical circumstance that 
have shaped water use, and the legal institutions that developed to protect water uses, 
have constrained the ability to shift water from one use to another. In the context of 
competition for resources on the Columbia, the ability to alter the use of water has been a 
binding constraint on river management. Given the pressure on the Columbia's resources, 
there is a need to examine whether some change in water use might be beneficial, and if 
so, how that change might be brought about in a way that is equitable for current water 
users 
This paper begins with a brief history of water law in the west, illustrating the 
roots of conflict over water allocation. A more detailed examination of activities in the 
Columbia Basin follows, describing the many parties affected by issues of water use and 
the overlapping institutional structures that govern the river and its water. 
Sources of pressure to change the current pattern of water use are then considered. 
These include requirements to protect endangered salmon runs and the change over time 
in the relative values of water for power production and irrigation. This section 
demonstrates how changes in the value of resources can create conflict when resource 
allocations are inflexible. 
Alternative approaches to water allocation are then detailed. An argument is 
made that water use on the Columbia should be flexible, and that the ability to transfer 
water more easily from one use to another would be beneficial. The potential economic, 
social, and environmental benefits and costs of water transfers are also considered. 
The final section of the paper looks at barriers to water transfers and 
recommendations for institutional change. The section offers examples of market 
structures and policy options that might overcome some of the obstacles to water 
transfers. The argument for a more flexible system of water allocation is then 
summarized. 
Water Use and Water Law in the West 
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Water is a scarce commodity in the west. Competition for water has shaped 
western economic and political conflict since the dawn of the frontier. The growth of 
western population and urban areas in recent decades has increased the pressure on water 
supplies and brought even greater scrutiny of water use. Water dedicated to irrigation has 
been the subject of much of this attention, largely because irrigation accounts for 90 
percent or more of consumptive water use in the western states (Gibbons 1986). 
Irrigation has been promoted by huge state and federal irrigation projects, and water from 
these projects is sold at heavily subsidized rates (Wahl 1989). The availability of 
subsidized water has led to questions about whether water is used efficiently in irrigation. 
Laws governing water allocation have also inhibited its transfer, making it difficult to 
obtain new supplies and leaving water in relatively low value uses. The combination of 
subsidies and legal barriers to trade has fueled a growing debate about the need for reform 
of western water law. 
Evolution of Western Water Law 
Western water law was shaped by the needs of a frontier society. The frontier 
offered individual freedom and economic opportunity, at least in the vision of those who 
migrated west. Frontier institutions were developed to promote settlement and private 
industry (National Research Council 1995). The laws regarding water use were no 
exception. 
Prior appropriation 
Water was a scarce and valuable resource throughout most of the west, necessary 
for mining, agriculture, and other activities. Often, water was not available where it was 
needed, so the right to move water and obtain assurance of its future availability was 
crucial for development. The doctrine of prior appropriation was developed on the 
frontier to provide stable and dependable water supplies. It allowed rights to be 
established quickly and provided a clear basis for resolving disputes. 
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The primary tenets of prior appropriation doctrine are ''first in time, first in right" 
and "beneficial use". "First in time, first in right" refers to the priority given various 
claims to water from the same source. Water in the west has generally been available to 
anyone who wished to stake a claim and put the water to use. That process has gradually 
been formalized, requiring modem claimants to file applications with a state water 
agency, but the basic process remains the same. Claims are granted based on the 
availability of unappropriated water from the source. If the source is deemed to have 
sufficient supply, the claim is granted. Because supply varies depending on annual 
precipitation, water is not always available to fill every claim. The first, or senior, claim 
is always granted priority and is filled in full before more junior claims are allotted any 
water. In times of water shortage, claims are filled in order and claimants at the end of 
the line may receive nothing. Senior claims are thus valuable and dependable; 
investments that depend on availability of water are secured by such claims at the 
expense of junior claimants, who face greater uncertainty. 
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"Beneficial use" refers to the requirement that any water claimed must be put to a 
particular, defined use. Beneficial uses are defined in the water laws of the various 
western states and have almost always required diversion of water from the source. Thus 
use of water for agriculture would be granted a vested right, while water left in a river for 
fish or other instream benefits could be appropriated at any time. The definition of 
beneficial use has gradually expanded, and most states (including Oregon, Washington, 
and Idaho) now include minimum streamflow in their definition of beneficial use (Estes 
1992, 1027). However, due to the overappropriation of western waterways, reservation 
of water for streamflow intensifies conflicts between other users. 
The requirement of beneficial use also limits the amount of water that can be 
claimed to the amount that is necessary for a given purpose. Excessive water use is 
prohibited. Any water that is not put to beneficial use is available to be claimed by 
anyone who wants to use it for a qualifying purpose. This provision is intended to ensure 
that water is not wasted. In practice, however, the requirement has been an impediment 
to water conservation and to the transfer of water between uses. 
For example, if irrigators or other water rights holders decrease their use of water 
through some curtailment or conservation measure, they may lose the right to that water 
under the beneficial use requirement. Appropriation law generally requires that water be 
used only on the land specified under the original claim. Use of conserved water to 
expand irrigated acreage would require amendment of the original claim. Similarly, 
transfer of the water to another user would require application to the state water agency. 
However, any such application might amount to an admission that the reclaimed water 
had previously been wasted and was thus not being put to beneficial use as the law 
requires. Reclaimed water may thus be subject to forfeiture, and the requirement of 
beneficial use can be a barrier to both transfers and conservation (Hartman and Seastone 
1970, 23-25). 
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None of these features of prior appropriation prevent water from being transferred 
or water rights from being traded. But neither is water treated as a simple commodity 
bought and sold in a market. Water itself is not owned, only the right to use it. Water 
rights are bought, sold, and otherwise transferred, but such transfers are subject to a 
variety of practical and legal restrictions. These requirements may be intended to protect 
other water users or to protect the general public interest, but they are often sufficiently 
ambiguous as to discourage most attempts at trade. 
One potential complication is that water rights may not clearly define the quantity 
of water available for use or trade. The quantity of water diverted and the quantity 
actually consumed may be far different, but only the quantity actually consumed is 
available for trade. In irrigation, the amount consumed is the amount actually transpired 
by plants or lost through evaporation. The remaining water either percolates into 
groundwater tables or flows as runoff to the next field, and thus is still available for use. 
If water rights were defined in terms of quantity diverted, downstream water users would 
be deprived of the runoff and return flow that is an integral part of irrigation. 
This restriction is intended to protect other water users, whose rights may depend 
on return flows or other established characteristics of water availability. If the consumed 
quantity is not defined in the water right, transfer is contingent on establishment of 
historic consumptive use. Establishing the quantity available for trade may entail a quasi-
judicial hearing, and may be challenged or protested by downstream water users. The 
need to establish consumptive use is one transaction cost that can be a barrier to trade. 
Other changes in water use, including purpose or place of use, point of diversion, sale, or 
temporary transfer, must generally be approved as well so that the interests of other 
claimants will be protected. Any change in water use that might affect another claim can 
be challenged, and this often leads to delays in water transfers. 
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The distinction between consumptive use and diversion raises a point about water 
conservation. As water supplies come under increasing pressure in the west, conservation 
has been promoted as a means of making water available for other uses. However, 
conservation measures may have serious implications for downstream water users unless 
conservation measures decrease consumptive use rather than diversion (Whittlesey 1993 ). 
Irrigation efficiency is generally defined as the portion of applied water that is actually 
consumed by crops. Efficiency can be improved by changes in application methods or 
changes in irrigation technology without affecting the amount of water actually 
consumed. Such conservation decreases return flows or percolation of water into the 
water table, making less water available to other uses. The only way to achieve true 
conservation of water is by decreasing actual consumption by crops. This can be 
achieved by planting crops that require less water or by applying less than the optimal 
amount of water for crop production, a technique called deficit irrigation. Water 
"conserved" in any other fashion, however, is not truly surplus water nor is it available 
for transfer or trade. 
Another potential barrier to water transfer is the control of water by irrigation 
districts or cooperatives rather than by individuals. Such entities may prohibit transfer of 
water they control, at least outside the bounds of a particular district, or they may prohibit 
transfer of their water to a purpose other than agriculture (National Research Council 
1995, 96-97). The existence of such districts, or restrictions placed on the district by state 
law or by their narrow focus on water supply, can make trading of water much more 
difficult. 
In order to transfer water, then, several hurdles must be cleared. The quantity of 
water involved must be well defined, both in terms of historical diversion and 
consumptive use. The right to that water must be clear; if irrigation districts or other 
distribution entities are involved, the possibilities for trade may be restricted. The 
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concerns of other water users must be addressed, and the transfer must meet any 
requirements placed by state laws. The new use must also be recognized as beneficial by 
state law. 
States may individually place greater or lesser burdens on water transfers. The 
state of Idaho, for example, has a number of conditions. Transfers may be allowed, 
provided other water rights are not injured, the original right is not enlarged, the change is 
consistent with water conservation, and is in the local public interest. The state code also 
provides that water may not be transferred out of agricultural use if the change would 
significantly affect the agricultural base of the local area (Idaho Code 42-222(1)). The 
state places additional restrictions on transfers across state lines. Idaho has one of the 
most restrictive codes, but other states also impose significant restrictions (National 
Research Council 1995). 
Other state powers 
In addition to the prior appropriation doctrine, there are other legal doctrines and 
legislative mandates that have a bearing on water rights and water transfers. One of the 
tools available to challenge current patterns of water use is the judicial doctrine of public 
trust. This doctrine establishes the duty of the state to protect public benefits in the use of 
waterways and has its origin in common law. The doctrine traditionally applies to all 
navigable waterways and establishes state ownership of submerged lands, especially 
coastal tidelands. In California, the doctrine has been used to protect public benefits such 
as recreation and environmental quality. The doctrine was used to protect the Mono Lake 
ecosystem from excessive withdrawals by the city of Los Angeles (National Research 
Council 1992, 101). Each state, however, enforces its own interpretation of public trust 
and few states have been as aggressive as California. 
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States are also empowered to establish laws that protect the public interest. Public 
interest protection is written in to most state laws regulating water transfers, but the effect 
of such provisions is largely to protect the interests served by current water allocations. 
Protection of the public interest has served as the justification for regulating land use, but 
such state regulation of water use has been much less developed. Water use planning, 
however, is becoming more widespread. Oregon is one of a few states that have adopted 
relatively comprehensive approaches to water planning (Squier 1979), but most states 
have begun to protect instream flows (National Research Council 1992). Oregon now 
requires that a portion of all salvaged or conserved water must be dedicated to instream 
flows (National Research Council 1992, 83), and states could require similar exactions as 
a condition for granting water transfers or changes in water use. Limitation on water use 
imposed in the public interest, however, could engender heated controversy such as 
currently exists over land use regulations. States may be hesitant to stir such controversy. 
Federal role 
The federal government also has a role in water law. The U.S. Supreme court 
held in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas (458 U.S. 941 (1982)) that water is an item 
of interstate commerce and therefore may not be prohibited by the states, but restrictions 
based on protection of health and welfare are allowed. The Court indicated that water, at 
least insofar as used for irrigation, is clearly subject to federal regulation (Reisner and 
Bates 1990). Federal legislation would take precedence over state law, but the federal 
government has always deferred to the states in matters of water allocation. In practice, 
states have managed to impose a number of restrictions on interstate transfers. 
The federal government is more directly involved in the control of water at federal 
projects. The Bureau of Reclamation obtains rights to water for their projects through the 
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states through normal state procedures. It then holds those rights and generally 
distributes water to irrigators through districts on the basis of repayment contracts 
(Butcher, Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986). The Bureau thus has some control over 
the transfer of project water. The Bureau's position in water transfers is somewhat 
ambiguous. It has issued a set of "Principles Governing Voluntary Water Transactions" 
(U.S. Department of the Interior 1988), but the guidelines are relatively vague and the 
Bureau has not actively promoted transfers (National Research Council 1992). Since 
Bureau water is generally distributed through districts, the individual districts may pose 
an additional barrier to trades. Moreover, transfer of water from federal projects is 
subject to the same state requirements as any other transfer. 
The legal and institutional structures affecting water use were shaped by the 
environment of the western frontier. The doctrine of prior appropriation served the needs 
of the frontier well, but the patterns of use and the institutions that developed around that 
doctrine conflict with the needs, priorities, and values being expressed at the end of the 
twentieth century. The doctrine presents significant barriers to conservation and to 
transfer of water between uses. Although states may have the ability to impose new 
requirements on present water users to protect instream uses and promote efficiency, such 
requirements would undoubtedly be controversial. Nonetheless, changes are beginning to 
be imposed on the prior appropriation framework. 
Water Allocation in the Columbia Basin 
Water law in the northwest states of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana is 
based primarily on the prior appropriation doctrine. The sources of competition for water 
resources are somewhat different in the northwest than is typically the case in other parts 
of the west. In Southern California and the desert southwest, competition has typically 
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been between irrigation and urban growth. As new sources of water for urban residents 
become more and more expensive, cities have eyed relatively inexpensive water used by 
irrigators as potential new supply. Transfers of water for municipal and industrial use 
have occurred in California, Arizona, and other areas of the southwest (Smith 1989; 
National Resource Council 1992). In contrast, competition in the northwest is primarily 
between irrigation and the instream use of water for power production, fish habitat, and 
other benefits. Conflict has developed over how much water should be taken out of the 
system for irrigation and over who will control that decision. 
Affected Parties 
The interests at stake in the Columbia Basin are numerous. The values that define 
those interests are often economic, but include cultural, aesthetic, and other 
considerations. The broad spectrum of interests and the multiple and conflicting 
objectives they impose on management of the basin create a complex political, social and 
economic environment resistant to change. 
The groups with interests in the Columbia Basin can be broken down into four 
broad categories. Consumers and producers of electric power make up the first broad 
group, which includes the federal agencies charged with operating the dams and 
marketing power. Those who divert water from the river compose the second broad 
group, which is dominated by irrigators and the agencies that manage federal irrigation 
projects. The third is concerned with fisheries and wildlife, and includes environmental 
organizations, recreational and commercial fishers, and federal and state fish and wildlife 
management agencies. The various Native American tribes in the region also have a 
great stake in management of the basin and their interests span many aspects of river 
management. The tribes are particularly affected by the decline of salmon runs, which 
have been central to their society for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years. 
Power production and consumption 
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Electric power is produced in the Columbia Basin by a series of federal and 
private dams. Fourteen federal dams have been built a part of the federal power system, 
twelve by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) and two by Bureau of Reclamation 
(Reclamation). The early ACE projects were built primarily for flood control and 
navigation purposes and later became major power producers, while later projects were 
built primarily for power production. The Reclamation dams were built primarily for 
irrigation, although the dams also produce a significant amount of power. In addition, 
other federal projects in the basin bring the total number of federal dams to thirty. In 
addition to the federal dams, numerous private dams have been built for both power and 
irrigation, including five on the main stem of the Columbia and ten in the middle and 
upper portions of the Snake River Basin. In total, there are some 255 federal and private 
water projects on the Columbia and its tributaries, with locations in British Columbia, 
Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington (U.S. Department of Energy 1995c, 2-1). 
Power produced by the Columbia River Power System is marketed by the 
Bonneville Power Administration. The dams are actually operated by the ACE, and have 
been managed in the past primarily to maximize power production. Power demand is 
highest in the fall and winter months, so the system has been built to store spring runoff 
for release when demand is high. The ability to manage the dams for maximum power 
production has been limited by the need to increase river flows in the spring and summer 
for salmon. 
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BP A markets power wholesale to numerous public and private utility companies 
and to the Direct Service Industries (DSI), large industrial users most of whom are 
aluminum smelters. These purchasers of electricity have all benefited in the past by the 
low rates BP A was able to offer on its inexpensive and abundant hydropower. 
There are several classes of BP A customers, all with somewhat different rate 
structures. BP A bases its rates to DSis on factors such as the predictability of demand 
and the willingness of DSis to purchase non-firm power (power that is not guaranteed and 
which may be interrupted). The public power preference dates from BP A's origin in the 
1930s, and guarantees public utilities first priority for power purchases. In addition, BPA 
offers a special rate to private utilities on the power they purchase for residential 
customers through the residential exchange (MacKenzie 1995b ). 
All electricity consumers in the Northwest have benefited from inexpensive 
hydropower. Electricity rates in the Northwest are among the lowest in the country. 
BPA's customers have a vested interest in protecting these low rates. Until recently, BPA 
had no price competition as its costs were far below those of any other producer. The 
squeeze between rising costs and emerging sources of low-cost electricity has BP A 
officials concerned for the first time about the need to compete in the market. Whereas in 
the past BP A could recover costs for various programs such as conservation promotion 
and fish and wildlife protection in its rates, it is no longer possible for BPA to write a 
blank check for such programs. 
Private power companies also have a large stake in the management of stream 
flows in the Columbia River Basin. Many of the dams are owned by private companies, 
and their ability to produce power is directly influenced by decisions made about 
management of the flow regime. The issue is particularly salient in Idaho, where the 
Idaho Power Company owns dams that produce most of the electricity in the state. 
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Water users 
The primary consumers of water in the Columbia River Basin are irrigators. More 
than 7 million acres of land are under irrigation in the Basin. More than 32 million acre-
feet (mat) of water are diverted for irrigation, and of those almost 14 maf are consumed 
while most of the remainder runs back to the rivers in return flows (U.S. Department of 
Energy 1995b, 2-5). Irrigation is provided by Bureau of Reclamation projects 
throughout the region, as well as by private irrigators. 
Irrigation is particularly intense in the Snake River Basin in Idaho. Although only 
about 18% of the basin's water volume flows through the Snake (U.S. Department of 
Energy 1995c, 2-1), it provides water to almost half the region's irrigated acreage (U.S. 
Department of Energy l 995b, 2-6). Agriculture in Idaho is heavily dependent on this 
source of water, and the state has actively asserted its authority over water appropriations. 
Water is also used for municipal and industrial purposes, but the volume of water 
consumed for these purposes is very small. Most of the water that flows to cities and 
industries is returned, so the overall impact on river volumes is negligible. 
Authority over water use is vested with the states. Water rights are generally 
allocated through a system of prior appropriation, as described above. Water allocation is 
one of the only aspects of river management that remains almost solely in control of state 
government. 
Fish and wildlife 
Estimates of the number of fish spawning in the Columbia Basin at the peak of 
harvests in the late 1800s range as high as 16 million (U.S. Department of Energy 1995a). 
The salmon fishery has supported both commercial and traditional, subsistence harvests. 
In addition, salmon have been popular targets for sport, and have supported a large 
recreational fishery. 
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Three species of salmon in the lower Snake River Basin have now been declared 
endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Biological opinions have been 
prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to guide salmon restoration 
measures. In addition, the Northwest Power Planning Council (NWPPC) has prepared 
salmon restoration plans in concert with states and federal agencies. The need to protect 
endangered salmon runs has significantly affected river operations. 
One of the primary features of salmon restoration plans is a call to increase river 
flows in spring and summer when juvenile fish are migrating to the sea. Salmon 
restoration measures have also included collection of juvenile fish at upstream dams to be 
transported by barge to the sea. This measure is intended to protect juvenile fish from 
predation and from injury in passing over dams or through power turbines. 
A number of environmental organizations have called attention to the plight of the 
salmon. The Environmental Defense Fund and the Sierra Club have advocated various 
approaches to salmon management. Groups such as Trout Unlimited, which focuses on 
protection of fish stocks and recreational fisheries, have also been involved. Such groups 
have pushed for listing of additional salmon stocks as threatened or endangered, and have 
been involved with court actions demanding protection for the fish. 
Tribal government 
The connection between various Native American tribes and the Columbia River 
is both long and deep. Tribal nations have relied on salmon as a source of food, and their 
annual migrations have a central role in their cultural and economic life. Tribes have 
been guaranteed a portion of harvests on the Columbia and elsewhere throughout the 
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region, but have had little power to prevent the decline of salmon stocks. Tribal 
governments currently have a central role in fishery management, including operation of 
numerous salmon hatcheries. They are also involved with state and regional planning to 
restore salmon runs (U.S. Department of Energy 1995a). 
Other activities 
Dams on the Columbia also provide navigation, recreation, and flood control 
benefits. Locks in the dams allow barges to navigate the river, primarily to haul grain and 
other agricultural products. Navigation competes to a degree with power production, as 
water used in the locks bypasses power turbines. Many recreational activities are 
associated with the various reservoirs on the river, and to the extent water is released for 
salmon, activities at reservoirs will suffer. Effective flood control requires that sufficient 
storage capacity be maintained in the spring to capture runoff and prevent flooding. This 
necessity sometimes conflicts with ideal storage patterns for power production. 
Columbia Basin Planning and Management 
In the case of water management on the Columbia, there is a curious dichotomy 
between authority to manage the river system and authority over the water in the river 
itself. Dams are operated by the Army Corps of Engineers to achieve multiple objectives, 
although the Corps generally follows the requests of the Bonneville Power 
Administration to shape river flows for maximum power generation. The individual 
states, however, have no direct authority over the operation of the federal power system 
and only marginal influence over river management. 
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On the other hand, the federal government has left control over water withdrawal 
and allocation to the states. Even water rights held by the Bureau of Reclamation are 
granted by states and are essentially transferred through Reclamation to irrigation districts 
and individual irrigators. States retain authority over Reclamation water to the extent that 
Reclamation is only authorized to use the water for the purposes stated in applications for 
water rights and any transfer of water or change in purpose of use is subject to state law. 
Control over withdrawals and water appropriation 
Conflict develops between power producers and irrigators in part because those 
who operate dams are generally powerless to protect flows. States have the ability to 
grant water rights for power production, but where this has been done the right is almost 
always made subordinate to future withdrawals for irrigation. In practice, power 
producers have not been able to protect minimum flows nor to bargain with current or 
potential irrigators over use of the water. In theory, power producers might offer to pay 
potential irrigators not to develop new land, but since there is no protection for flows for 
generation, producers could end up paying several times to protect the same water 
(Butcher, Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986, 60). The inability of power producers to 
protect flows is a severe disincentive to potential purchases or leases of water rights for 
power production. 
Until recently, instream uses for wildlife habitat had no right to the water and little 
protection under state laws. Although states have begun to recognize the value of 
minimum flows for habitat protection, protection is intended to prevent future reductions 
rather than curtail present use. The value of minimum flows must be taken into account 
in evaluating future applications for water diversion, and recognition of minimum flows 
allows the voluntary transfer of water from diversionary to instream use. While states 
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have the power to limit present rights or even to reclaim them through eminent domain, 
the political and economic power of agricultural interests makes this prospect unlikely. 
Opposition to such actions, or to any change in water use at all, can be inferred from 
legislation such as that introduced in Oregon that would have prevented water presently 
used in agriculture from ever being transferred to another use (Middaugh 1996). That the 
legislation passed the Oregon House (but failed in the Senate) underscores how seriously 
farmers view the need to protect water rights. 
State control over water resources is rooted in an institutional structure that 
reflects the goals and needs of the past. The institutions were not developed to be flexible 
or to adapt to changing needs, but rather to provide stability and certainty. As Kai N. Lee 
(1993, 154) states in Compass and Gyroscope: 
The perversities of water law result from the proper functioning of 
institutions, following the mandates assigned by legislatures or a [state] 
constitution. A cure cannot be found in better implementation of policy or 
law, but in changing the law. That entails social and political action, 
which usually encounters resistance from those who benefit from the 
institutional arrangements as they are. (Emphasis in original.) 
Control over instream uses 
In contrast to the system of water allocation embodied in state law, the 
management of water that remains in the Columbia system is directed by principles of 
multiple use and regional cooperation. The overlapping purposes of the BP A, ACE, and 
Reclamation force some cooperation and integration onto these federal agencies. The 
structure of the Northwest Power Act, which combines power planning with fish and 
wildlife protection and establishes a forum through the NWPPC for planning across state 
lines and between states and the federal agencies, provides an institutional structure with 
considerable capacity to incorporate the range of values that flow from water and to 
balance and integrate multiple objectives. 
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The Northwest Power Act, passed by Congress in 1980, established the NWPPC, 
which provides a forum for regional coordination of the federal power system. The act 
also required that beneficiaries of the power system pay for wildlife programs to offset 
the environmental costs imposed by the dams. In practice, BP A has assumed 
responsibility for fish and wildlife funding in the basin. Power plans and salmon 
management plans formulated by the NWPPC in accordance with the act have provided a 
forum for various interested and affected parties in the area to become involved with 
regional planning, and have force federal agencies to respond to regional objectives. 
The NWPPC has adopted the principle of adaptive management to guide its 
efforts for salmon restoration. Adaptive management incorporates data gathering and 
scientific analysis into implementation of recovery measures so that a knowledge base 
regarding the effect ofrecovery plans can be built (Lee 1993). Adaptive management 
requires consistent application and long-term approach. One of the primary institutional 
requirements is stability and continuity, so that programs are administered consistently 
and insulated from political factors that might alter programs, cut funds, or change 
management objectives. 
The primary benefits provided by dams on the Columbia are power production, 
irrigation, flood control, navigation, and recreation. Of these, only irrigation removes a 
significant amount of water from the river system, and only irrigation falls outside the 
management scope of the Northwest Power Act. The changes in river operation that have 
been made to benefit salmon have imposed costs on power producers which have not 
been shared by other beneficiaries of the dams (Northwest Power Planning Council 1995, 
18). Irrigators have been insulated from paying the direct costs of fish and wildlife 
programs and from sharing the indirect costs associated with changes in the timing of 
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river flows. Salmon recovery plans have called for acquisition of water from irrigators, 
but opposition from irrigators has prevented any significant shift of water from irrigation 
to instream flow (Middaugh 1996). The inability to obtain water, through purchase, 
rental, or other means, decreases the flexibility of the river system. If the waters in the 
basin are to be managed for multiple purposes, some way of allowing water to shift from 
agricultural to other uses is needed. 
Pressure for Change 
The call for changes in water law or allocation is controversial and the need for 
such change has been disputed. Two circumstances are creating pressure for change. The 
first is the call in salmon management plans for the acquisition of water from willing 
sellers in order to supplement river flows. The second is the existence of multiple 
economic uses for water resources. In particular, expansion of generating capacity has 
led to questions about the value of water in some agricultural applications. Although 
hydropower capacity reached its maximum in the 1970s, renewed financial pressure on 
BP A has led to a reexamination of the opportunity cost of irrigation for hydropower 
production (Committee on Natural Resources 1993; Committee on Natural Resources 
1994). 
Salmon Restoration and the Endangered Species Act 
The primary pressure for change may come from the courts, as new lawsuits are 
filed under the Endangered Species Act. The NMFS has yet to impose a binding program 
for salmon protection, althogh its Biological Opinions have served as guidelines for river 
management. Should current measures fail to stem declines in population, or should state 
actions prevent recovery plans from being implemented, or should some group simply 
decide that actions taken so far are insufficient, federal courts may be asked to impose 
their own restrictions on water use and basin management. This possibility may be 
sufficient to cause states to reexamine the current system of water allocation before 
change is forced on them by the courts (Estes 1992). 
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Acquisition of water for flow augmentation in the Snake River Basin has been 
called for within the context of federal, state, and regional plans for salmon recovery 
(U.S. Department of Energy 1995a, 10-6). Plans from the NWPPC and the NMFS called 
for 427,000 afto be delivered from Bureau of Reclamation projects beginning in 1992. 
This water was to be obtained from uncontracted storage space in Reclamation reservoirs 
and from water rentals through the Snake River water bank, and has been successfully 
delivered by the Reclamation for 1993-1995. The NWPPC has also called for the 
acquisition of an additional 1 maf from the Upper Snake Basin. The call for such 
transfers is controversial, however, and has been resisted by irrigators and the state of 
Idaho. 
The biological case for increasing the flow of water in the spring and summer is 
not clear cut (National Research Council 1995). There are apparent advantages to 
decreasing the travel time of juvenile salmon, but part of the purpose of the flow program 
is to document the effect of increased flows on salmon survival . Maintaining flow 
targets, however, is particularly important in low-flow years, when flow targets are least 
likely to be achieved. If water to maintain flows is not allocated in all years, including 
dry ones, court-ordered water reallocation is certainly a possibility. 
The benefits that might be obtained from water reallocation are not limited to 
salmon recovery. For a number of years, the argument has been made that some water 
now used in irrigation may be more valuable if shifted to power production. The case for 
shifting water from irrigation to hydropower is complementary to the case for salmon 
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flows. Although not all water released for salmon can be used to increase power 
production, increased spring and summer flow does result in additional generation. The 
ability to shift some water from agricultural to instream use could also allow more water 
to remain in storage for power production in the fall and winter, when demand for 
electricity is at its highest. 
Opportunity Costs in Irrigation 
The use of water that has attracted the most scrutiny, not only on the Columbia 
but in the west in general, is irrigation. The efficiency of water use in irrigation has been 
questioned in part because under prior appropriation, water has been easy to obtain but 
difficult to sell or trade. Because water often has no exchange value, it will be used to the 
point where the last unit of water consumed has little value to the user, where production 
just covers the cost of the water. This is the same as saying the marginal value product 
of water in irrigation is equal to its marginal cost. Water is generally free at the point of 
diversion, with irrigators responsible only for the cost of transporting that water to their 
land. This implies that the marginal value of water at the point of diversion will be close 
to zero (Butcher, Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986). 
The efficiency implications of this arrangement are best illustrated by comparing 
the marginal value product of water in agriculture to that in other uses. The efficient 
allocation would equalize the marginal value product of water across various uses. When 
water can be stored to produce electricity, its marginal value is considerably greater than 
zero (how much greater depends on a variety of factors). 
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Marginal water values in irrigation 
One detailed estimate of the marginal value of water in irrigated agriculture in the 
Snake River Basin was made by the USDA. Utilizing 1987 data, USDA estimated the 
total producer profit that would be lost with incremental reductions in water for irrigation. 
Extrapolating from this data, the Environmental Defense Fund (Diamant and Willey 
1995) estimated the marginal value per acre-foot of water in the Upper Snake River 
Basin. This value ranges from $12.65 per acre-foot (af) for the last 100,000 af used in 
irrigation to $43.42 for the increment from 1.3 to 1.6 million af (1994 dollars). 
Another estimate of the marginal value of water in Snake River irrigation can be 
derived from research by Joel R. Hamilton, Norman K. Whittlesey, and Philip Halverson 
(1989). This research was conducted to determine the feasibility of a contingent water 
market in the Snake River basin, in which irrigators would contract to reduce water use in 
low water years. Based on models of several different farm configurations and 
assumptions about the value of firm power, the research demonstrated that the benefits 
expected from such a market exceeded the costs by a factor of nine (73). This is 
particularly significant as the benefits were limited to those that would accrue in the state 
of Idaho and ignored the additional hydropower that would be generated by dams further 
down the Snake and Columbia Rivers. 
Although not intended to measure the marginal value of water in agricultural 
production, their modeling of farm operations provides the necessary information to 
derive such an estimate (table 1). The researchers estimated net revenue per acre 
associated with incremental reductions in irrigation water delivered. The model allowed 
for adjustments to inputs such as labor and generated several possible combinations of 
inputs and yield for each level of consumptive water use. 
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The average incremental water values reported in table 1 should be interpreted 
with caution. They are based on data from only one of the seven farm types modeled in 
the study. In some cases aggregation of the data may have hidden pertinent effects. 
Nevertheless, the direction of change and magnitude of the values derived is consistent 
with what would be expected from theory and intuition, and is not inconsistent with the 
values reported in the USDA study. If the model is a reasonable representation of actual 
farm operation, it demonstrates that the initial marginal value of water is relatively low. 
Table 1: 
Response to changes in water supply for the rill irrigated farm in Southeast Idaho1 
Percent reduction in delivered water supply 
0 31 39 50 60 63 69 
Water use (acre-inches/ acre) 
Delivery 58 40 36 29 23 22 23 
Consumptive 19 17 16 14 13 12 12 
Irrigation efficiency (%) 33 43 46 50 54 53 53 
Net revenue ($/irrigable acre) 134 129 126 120 111 105 92 
Average incremental water 
value ($/acre-foot)2 n.a. 30 29 39 58 78 87 
1 Production costs, water requirements, crop yields, and prices represent 1986 levels. 
2 Incremental value= 12/(change in consumptive use by crop*% crop acreage)* change in net revenue. 
Consumptive use by crop and % crop acreage are not shown, but their product is approximately equal to 
the aggregate change in consumptive use. Change in consumptive use * change in net revenue does not 
equal incremental water value due to rounding error. 
Adapted from: Hamilton, Joel R., Norman K. Whittlesey, and Philip Halverson. 1989. Interruptible water 
markets in the Pacific Northwest. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71 (February): 63-75. 
There is a temptation to use average water values in irrigation as a basis for 
comparison to alternative uses. In the short run, the net farm income can be attributed to 
the value of water. Some studies have reported the average net return per acre-foot of 
water as the value of water. These values are usually specific to a particular crop. A 
study of the Yakima Basin in Washington State reported water values ranging from $10 -
$86 per af at 1980 price levels, with hops and alfalfa representing the low values and 
orchard crops (pears and apples) accruing high values (Gibbons 1986, 39). The figures 
from table 1 can be used to estimate average value per acre-foot on the model farm, 
which figures to $85 with unrestricted irrigation at 1986 price levels. Such average 
values may be well above the average value of water in an alternative use. 
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While these average short-term values may be illustrative of the contribution of 
irrigation to agricultural income, they do not provide a good basis for assessing the 
distribution of water resources. For that, it is the marginal values of water in various uses 
rather than the average values that should be compared. The observation has been made 
that where high prices for irrigated land are found, such prices indicate a return to water 
on these lands greater than the marginal return expected from other uses (Butcher, 
Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986). While land price is undoubtedly a reasonable 
indicator of average returns, average returns are irrelevant to determining efficient 
allocation. The question of whether resources are efficiently allocated at the margin 
requires comparison of marginal values, and as long as water is free at the point of 
diversion, the marginal value of that water is likely to be very low no matter how high the 
average returns. Available evidence points to a low value for the last increments of water 
used in irrigation. 
Marginal water values in power production 
Regardless of what value is assigned, there is seldom a time when the marginal 
value to the power system of additional water in the river reaches zero. Capacity of the 
system has been greatly expanded so that in many years all of the water flowing through 
the river can be used to generate power. Only when the flow is greatly above normal 
must water be spilled over the dams without contributing to power generation (Butcher, 
Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986, 36). Due to restrictions on operation of the river 
system that have been imposed to help restore salmon runs, it is a reasonable 
approximation to assume that the marginal value of water for electricity production is 
never zero. 
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The amount of generation potential lost when water is used in irrigation instead of 
to generate power depends on where in the system the irrigation water is withdrawn. The 
further upriver the point of withdrawal, the more generation potential is lost. At 
American Falls dam, the highest dam on the Snake river affected significantly by 
irrigation withdrawals, the cumulative generating capacity per acre-foot of water for all 
dams below and including American Falls is 1,821 kilowatt-hours (kwh). The 
comparable figure for Brownlee Dam, on the middle stretch of the Snake, is 1, 141 kwh. 
At Grand Coulee, on the middle stretch of the Columbia, the figure is 1,015 kwh, and at 
McNary, just below the confluence of the Columbia and the Snake, the capacity is 275 
kwh (Butcher, Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986). 
These capacity figures are estimated averages, as the power generated varies 
throughout the year and from year to year. McCarl and Ross (1984) compared estimates 
based on these averages to estimates based on historical flow and generation records 
maintained by BP A. For most of their results, the estimates based on monthly historic 
data were not significantly different from the results based on the single average (24). 
Thus while the above estimates of generating capacity are not perfect, they provide a 
reasonable basis for estimates of water values in power production. 
Estimates of the marginal value of water for power production vary depending on 
assumptions about the value of electricity. The value of electricity generation at the 
margin has been equated with the avoided cost of acquiring the next least-expensive 
resource (Hamilton and Whittlesey 1986), the difference between rates for firm and 
surplus power (Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson 1989) , and with the avoided 
operating cost of thermal power resources (McCarl and Ross 1984). Depending on 
assumptions about how the power system is managed, it may be appropriate to simply 
equate the value of additional generation with the going rate for surplus power. 
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The first estimates of the opportunity cost of irrigation on the Columbia were 
derived from proposals for irrigation expansion made in the late 1970s and early 80s 
(Hamilton and Whittlesey 1986). The results of that analysis showed that the total costs 
of various projects outweighed the expected benefits when subsidized power rates and 
foregone power revenues were considered. The value of power at that time was estimated 
at 35 mills ($0.035) per kwh and the opportunity cost of diverting one acre-foot was 
estimated to be $64.00 at American Falls dam and $36.00 at Grand Coulee (Butcher, 
Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986). 
Both technology and market structure in the electricity industry have changed 
significantly since the early 1980s. Low-cost power is being marketed up and down the 
west coast, and new combined-cycle combustion turbines fueled by natural gas have 
increased their efficiency significantly. This, combined with historically low prices for 
natural gas, has brought down the price of electricity for utilities as well as decreasing the 
cost of adding generating capacity. The combined capital and operating cost for 
combustion turbines is estimated at 26.3 mills/kwh in 1996 dollars. Of that, 14.9 mills 
represents the fixed capital cost and 11.4 mills the operating cost (U.S. Department of 
Energy 1995c, 4-20). The price of firm power in 1995 was at a comparable level, 
although the range of prices by time of year and quantity purchased was between 19 and 
49 mills. In comparison, the price of non-firm power in April of 1996 was from 9-13 
mills during peak demand and 5-7 mills off-peak (O'Donnell 1996). The range through 
the year was estimated to be 7 .5 to 22 mills, again depending on time of year and quantity 
purchased (U.S. Department of Energy 1995c, 4-22). 
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Strictly for purposes of comparison, the opportunity cost of irrigation diversions 
at several different dams was calculated for two price levels, 26 mills and 12 mills. The 
26 mills is representative of both the price of firm power in the market and the cost of 
adding generating capacity with combined-cycle turbines. The 12 mills is representative 
of both the price of non-firm power and the operating cost of turbines. The range of 
opportunity costs is listed in table 2. If water made available from irrigation can be used 
to shape river flows and increase the amount of power that can be generated in critical 
water years ("critical" defined as that portion of the historical stream flow that would 
produce the least amount of energy), the power so generated would be valued at firm 
rates. If additional water simply allowed the system to produce more power overall, such 
power would be valued at non-firm rates. In practice, reallocation of water might be 
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1 Butcher, Walter R. and Philip R. Wandschneider, with Norman K. Whittlesey. 1986. Competition 
between irrigation and hydropower in the Pacific Northwest. In Scarce water and institutional change, ed. 
Kenneth D. Frederick, 25-66. Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 33. 
Foregone power production is not the only cost of irrigation diversions. In the 
past, irrigators have been granted subsidized rates for power used to pump water and 
pressurize irrigation systems. The irrigation discount the BP A has offered to irrigators in 
the past is currently being phased out, but the rates paid at dams run by the Bureau of 
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Reclamation have been set by contract years ago. The System Operation Review (SOR) 
assumes that irrigators at such projects will continue to pay a rate of just 0.95 mills per 
kwh (U.S. Department of Energy 1995c). This compares to rates of25 mills and 33.5 
mills paid by irrigators in Washington and Oregon, respectively, at the John Day 
reservoir (U.S. Department of Energy 1995b, 3-4). 
One of the largest Bureau of Reclamation projects in the country is Grand Coulee 
Dam and its reservoir, Lake Roosevelt. Water from the reservoir is currently used to 
irrigate over 500,000 acres. The SOR estimates that current operations require 959,254 
megawatt-hours (mwh) per year. The cost of that power to irrigators is $911,000. If 
irrigators were instead charged market rates for that power, at a rate of $25.00 per mwh 
(25 mills per kwh), the cost is $24 million. This means that ratepayers in the region 
provide a $23 million dollar annual subsidy to irrigators in the Columbia River Project. 
Assuming that 875 kwh is required to pump each acre-foot of water from Lake Roosevelt 
and to pressurize sprinkler systems (Hamilton and Whittlesey 1986), the subsidy per acre-
foot (at 24 mills per kwh) is $21.00. The total social cost of that irrigation water equals 
the opportunity cost plus the subsidy. Thus for water taken from Lake Roosevelt, the 
social cost is between $33.00 and $47.00 per acre-foot. 
It is impossible to say de facto how much water might be transferred productively 
from irrigation to power generation. Many factors such as crop prices, power prices, 
point of diversion, irrigation technology, input prices, interest rates, and others may affect 
the economic value of water in different applications. The best way of accounting for 
such factors may be through some form of water market, where the parties to the 
transaction effectively resolve such questions in establishing a price. There are many 
institutional and legal issues that would need to be resolved to establish such a market, 
but the potential benefits may make the effort well worth while. 
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Two studies have concluded that some form of water market in the Snake River 
basin would not only generate a net economic benefit, but would also be a cost-effective 
means of providing greater flows for salmon. In an extension of their earlier study on 
contingent water markets in the Snake River basin (Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson 
1989), Joel Hamilton and Norm Whittlesey conclude that establishing a contingent water 
market to transfer water from agricultural to instream use in dry years would provide 
flows necessary for salmon restoration while generating additional power worth twice the 
anticipated loss of farm income (Huffaker, Whittlesey, and Wandschneider 1993). In a 
comparison of several alternative proposals for salmon restoration, the Environmental 
Defense Fund concluded that the two market-based scenarios they considered were the 
most cost-effective of all options studied, and that under most assumptions such markets 
would provide net economic benefits in addition to the benefits for salmon restoration 
(Diamant and Willey 1995). 
Based on this analysis, it is clear that the value of water for power generation 
often exceeds its value in irrigation at the margin. This implies that there is a potential 
for a pareto improvement through reallocation of water, or at the minimum a potential net 
benefit. Achieving that potential, even partially, may prove quite difficult. The way in 
which water rights have been defined in the law has inhibited the selling or trading of 
those rights, although transfers from one agricultural use to another have generally been 
easier to achieve than transfers out of agriculture altogether (National Research Council 
1992). The need to carefully define water rights and to consider the secondary effects 
that transfers may have on other users can impose substantial transactions costs on even 
relatively simple water transfers. The political clout of agricultural interests has also in 
many cases prevented the serious consideration of water transfers. 
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Mechanisms for Implementing Water Transfers 
If the current allocation of water is inefficient and present uses cause harm to the 
environment, then water should be redistributed. The question then becomes, how should 
water distribution be determined? There are two primary approaches to achieving water 
transfers: voluntary and involuntary. Our political culture prefers voluntary approaches 
in general because they minimize government involvement. On the other hand, consumer 
and environmental groups often question the effectiveness of voluntary regulations, 
arguing, for instance, that consumer and environmental protection should be mandatory. 
There is a tension between the desire to minimize governmental regulation of private 
activity and skepticism toward the prospect that public interests can be served in the 
pursuit of private ends. 
Water Markets 
The case for a free-market allocation of water has been forcefully presented by 
Terry Anderson (1983). He argues that values in water can be captured in the private 
market as long as water can be purchased for any use and water is freely transferable. 
Along those lines, James Huffman (1983) argues that instream values for water could be 
protected in a private market if water rights were easily transferable to instream use. 
Other economists have argued, however, that the many potential sources of market failure 
will overwhelm the possibility of efficient distribution through a free market. An 
unfettered market for water may be both unlikely and undesirable. As Richard L. 
Gardner (1987, 55) summarized, "The risk that unregulated water markets will ignore 
hydrologic externalities, public instream uses, and secondary benefits is simply too great 
[to allow such markets to develop]." 
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Water Plans 
Another possibility is that the distribution of water will be further removed from 
private control. Authority exists for states to exert a great deal of control over water 
allocation through application of the public trust doctrine, through regulation in 
protection of the public interest, and through incorporation of water into state planning 
processes. The state of Montana has asserted control over a great deal of unappropriated 
water by reserving it from appropriation. Reservation has been used to protect instream 
flows by granting reserved quantities to state agencies such as the Department of Fish and 
Game (Huffman 1983, 264). This approach was possible in Montana because much of 
the state waters had remained unappropriated. In other states, available supply is fully or 
even over appropriated. In such cases, states could authorize purchase of private water 
rights for various public purposes or even exercise the power of eminent domain. At the 
federal level, it is possible that the Endangered Species Act could supersede private water 
rights and require that water be left in a river to maintain flows for fish. Any of these 
measures might result in government control over water appropriations to a much greater 
degree than is currently the case, but it seems unlikely that centralized control would 
develop fully in the political culture of the U.S., and centralized control is certainly no 
guarantee of efficient allocation. 
Regulation and Economic Incentives 
With respect to water, there are several reasons to think that reallocation can be 
achieved through voluntary means. The primary basis for this argument is that there are 
potential gains for all parties through voluntary market transfers, the obstacles to 
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establishing such markets notwithstanding. There is also a recognition that the political 
and legal obstacles to involuntary transfer may make forced reallocation infeasible. 
However, the development of an unregulated market appears unlikely and is probably 
undesirable. In an international survey of approaches to water management, the editors 
conclude that, "To safeguard equity, water quality, ecosystems, and future uses, water 
management should not be carried out solely through a market process or through a 
purely bureaucratic process. The ideal system would blend economic incentives, conflict 
resolution processes, and government action in a democratic system" (Loehman and 
Dinar 1995, viii). 
Such a system already exists in several dimensions with respect to management of 
the federal power system. The presence of the NWPPC as a regional institution that 
could set the parameters for water marketing and potentially resolve interstate and 
intergovernmental conflicts regarding transfers is an advantage for the region. The fact 
that the NWPPC, along with federal fish and wildlife agencies, has already called for 
water transfers and is studying the issue provides further evidence that the council may 
play a leading role in facilitating future water transfers. 
Whatever the regional approach to future water transfers, the pressure for change 
is likely to continue. The region has an opportunity to design a regulated market for 
water transfers that would offers flexibility while accounting for externalities and 
secondary impacts in the water transfer process. If mechanisms are not developed to 
facilitate water transfers in the region, economic and environmental demands on existing 
water resources will continue to increase and may lead to some form of involuntary 
transfers in the future. 
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Problems with Involuntary Transfers: The Endangered Species Act 
The ESA can be viewed as a mechanism for involuntary reallocation of property 
rights. The ESA acts to alter the type of rights or protections that are granted salmon and 
salmon habitat. The framework of property rights can be used to analyze the conflict 
over water uses in the Columbia Basin and the potential impact of the ESA. In this 
framework, there is a property right associated with each of the values created by water. 
Some types of rights take precedence over others, and the law serves to mediate conflict 
between them. 
Norman Whittlesey and Philip Wandschneider (1992) develop a discussion of 
salmon recovery around the issue of property rights. They identify three levels of 
entitlement to resources defined under the law (4). A property rule grants control of 
resources to an owner, and such resources can only be transferred, used, or harmed with 
the owner's permission. The property rule also grants to the owner the right to sell or 
trade resources and to set the price. Right to resources under an inalienability rule cannot 
be lost, but neither can they be traded or sold. A liability rule, on the other hand, 
establishes a requirement for compensation when resources are taken or destroyed, but 
grants little control over resources to the nominal owners. 
Water rights as they have been established under the doctrine of prior 
appropriation fall in the category of a modified property rule. The first change in 
property rights on the Columbia occurred as the common property of fish habitat was 
appropriated (and privatized) for off-stream use. The initial impact was minimal, but the 
absence of protection for the common property of fish habitat had long-term 
consequences. Off-stream water users established protected claims to water that held 
greater weight when conflicts over water use eventually arose. 
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Whittlesey and W andschneider describe the era of dam building as one in which 
salmon and their habitat were protected under a rule of weak liability (4). Little value 
was accorded to salmon, and mitigation of adverse effects on salmon population and 
habitat was only partially provided. As salmon populations continued to decline, the 
stocks decreased in value, but no owners or trustees of salmon habitat had the power to 
stop destructive actions or to demand full accounting and compensation for adverse 
effects. 
Listing of salmon species under the (ESA) has the potential to change protection 
of salmon and their habitat from a rule of liability to a rule of inalienability. The ESA 
establishes the absolute right of a species to protection, with all other considerations 
subordinate to that right. The ESA can thus serve to reallocate water uses and property 
rights on the Columbia. The ESA, however, is a rather blunt instrument, and provides no 
guidance on how to achieve redistribution or manage a habitat and ecosystem that 
extends over five states and two countries. The social and biological complexity of the 
issue overwhelms the ability of the ESA to define a coherent course of action. The region 
is thus struggling to avoid the kind of legal and political conflict that arose when the 
spotted owl was listed as endangered under the ESA in the late 1980s (Dietrich 1992). 
Use of the ESA as a mechanism to force the reallocation of property rights 
through the courts was at the heart of conflict over protection of forest habitat. The 
impact of such protections on the logging industry and on towns dependent on logging 
for an economic base was significant. Critics of the ESA argued that protection of 
endangered species should be balanced against the economic impact of such protection. 
The extension of logging restrictions and habitat protections to private land, in particular, 
led land owners to protest that their property was being taken without compensation 
(Stevens, William K. 1993). A resurgent wise use movement in the Northwest adopted 
such arguments in a call for repeal of government restrictions on private lands, including 
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major changes to the ESA. A backlash against environmental regulations was one of the 
factors that drove the conservative resurgence in the 1994 congressional elections. So far, 
the ESA has not been significantly changed or weakened, but neither has it been 
reauthorized except on an annual basis, and it remains the source of controversy. 
The long-term impact of battles over the spotted owl and the forests of the 
northwest is still being felt. Although protection for habitat was won in court, 
implementation of court decisions has been difficult. The election of President Clinton 
led to development of a forest plan that was eventually accepted in federal court as 
meeting the requirements of the ESA. Some areas designated for protection, however, 
have now been opened to logging under the so-called "salvage rider" that was passed by 
Congress and signed by the President. The application of the ESA in this instance has led 
to protracted political conflict and attacks on the law that may yet lead to its weakening. 
Moreover, the stability of the resolution achieved is clearly in doubt. 
Such experience with the Endangered Species Act argues strongly for alternatives 
to the forced reallocation of water on the Columbia. Although the ESA may have the 
potential to force some change, the political cost would undoubtedly be high and the 
long-term stability of changes forced by the act, uncertain. Since there is an opportunity 
to pursue voluntary water transfers, a more productive course might be to use existing 
regional institutions in an attempt to reduce barriers that currently prevent more 
widespread transfers from taking place. 
At one level, change in management of the Columbia river system requires a 
reallocation of property rights. At another level, it requires a reassessment of values. 
Change will occur as new interests are thrust into political discourse by 
environmentalists, consumer groups, Native American nations, and others who have had 
little representation in the past. In the Northwest, conflict engendered by resource 
depletion and population pressure has crystallized around endangered species and the 
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Endangered Species Act. In both the case of the spotted owl and salmon, the immediate 
issue is indicative of wider conflicts over ecosystem protection and management, 
resource use, property rights, and economic and environmental values. 
A primary goal of water trades and transfers is to provide flexibility in the use of 
water resources. In a competitive market, resources are allocated according to 
willingness of purchasers to pay for their use. When a new use develops that promises a 
better return than current uses, resources flow into that new use. The current structure of 
water law and allocation mechanisms creates many barriers that prevent water from 
flowing to new uses. In order to manage the Columbia Basin for multiple use and 
provide the best return on public and private investment, water allocation needs to be 
more flexible. That is not to say that control over water should be transferred from states 
to regional or federal authorities, or that changes in allocation should be imposed through 
the courts. Neither does it mean that all regulation of water transfer should be lifted. 
Rather, it means that creative mechanisms need to be developed that will promote 
efficient use of resources and environmental protection in a manner that is equitable to 
current water users. 
Issues in Water Transfers 
In order to evaluate potential reforms, the issues at stake need to be clearly 
identified. Table 3 summarizes factors that are involved in any potential water transfer. 
The multiple factors and parties involved make the subject of water transfers rife with 
controversy. This is particularly the case when water law and allocation has been 
predicated on a particular doctrine (prior appropriation) with a particular objective 
(development of the frontier), and the values associated with that doctrine decrease in 
importance as other values come to the fore. The values that built the frontier are no long 
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dominant in the Northwest, but at the very least must contend with other values that were 
of little concern in the past. 
Table 3: Factors in assessment of potential water transfers 
Type of Transfer: 
Change in ownership 
Change in point of diversion 
Change in use 
Change in systems operation 
Out-of-basin diversion 
Primary Process for Transfer: 
Voluntary 
Involuntary 















Other water rights holders 




Adapted from: Committee on Western Water Management, Water Science and Technology Board, 
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council. 1992. Water transfers in 
the West: Efficiency. equity and the environment. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 113. 
In evaluating the case for water transfers, all of these factors should be considered. 
The case in support of water transfers ultimately rests on the economic, environmental, 
and social effects that a transfer is expected to have. Policies that fail to balance all of 
these factors will face political opposition and practical barriers to implementation 
(Metzger 1987). A water transfer is likely to have positive effects in some areas and 
negative effects in others. Even water transfers that may have net positive economic, 
environmental, and social impacts can be controversial if the costs fall heavily on one 
particular group. 
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Opposition to water transfers is often based on expected social impacts. A 
common objection is that water transfers may harm rural communities. Such an impact is 
secondary from an economic point of view, that is, it will be offset by increased activity 
elsewhere. From the community or local view, however, such losses will be viewed as 
unfair. How are such impacts to be judged? On the one hand, reallocation of water has 
the potential to undermine some rural economies and communities, communities built on 
the assumption that water rights are valid and secure. On the other hand, present water 
uses may be viable only because water users are subsidized or otherwise insulated from 
costs associated with diversion. Opposition based on social impacts is often a reflection 
of the fact that costs and benefits, from water transfers and from other activities, are not 
equally shared. However, shifts in economic activity often come at a cost, as when 
declining industry in a sector or region is eclipsed by new activity. Such transitions are 
often difficult, but also difficult to resist. Voluntary transfers of water provide a 
mechanism for resource allocation that may be much less destructive than involuntary 
transfers that might occur in the future. 
Obstacles to Water Transfers 
The concerns of irrigators and of the northwestern states stand as obstacles to 
water transfers. So, too, do institutional structures designed to assign and protect water 
rights rather than facilitate their transfer. The attempt to transfer water from irrigation to 
instream use in the Snake River Basin serves to illustrate these obstacles. This example 
can be used to point out some of the economic and structural barriers to transfers as well 
as suggesting reforms that might overcome obstacles and lead to more broad-based water 
transfers in the future. 
42 
Water and Salmon in the Snake River Basin 
Acquisition of water for flow augmentation in the Snake River Basin has been 
called for within the context of federal, state, and regional plans for salmon recovery 
(U.S. Department of Energy 1995a, 10-6). Plans from the NWPPC and the NMFS called 
for 427,000 afto be delivered from Bureau of Reclamation projects beginning in 1992. 
This water was to be obtained from uncontracted storage space in Reclamation reservoirs 
and from water rentals through the Snake River water bank, and has been successfully 
delivered by Reclamation for 1993-1995. 
Reclamation has dedicated uncontracted storage capacity to flow augmentation, 
and has sought to reacquire storage space in its reservoirs. This strategy has emphasized 
acquiring unclaimed water rather than purchasing or renting water rights from irrigators. 
A portion of the flow augmentation has been purchased, however, from the Snake River 
water bank, which was formally established in 1980. The bank facilitates transfers 
between water users in the state, with priority given to irrigation use. The largest 
purchaser of water from the bank has been the Idaho Power Company. The availability 
of water from the bank varies considerably depending on the abundance of water in any 
given water year, as many irrigators have large reserve holdings as insurance against 
drought that are sold to the bank when not needed (Gardner 1987, 50). Thus far, water 
has been available through the bank for flow augmentation, but the priority given 
irrigators may make banked water unavailable in dry years. Restrictions on price and 
purpose of use have also kept the bank from reflecting the potential market value of 
water, although some price restrictions have been lifted (Wahl 1989). 
Within the state of Idaho, the Idaho Water Rental Policy Group (later renamed the 
Snake River Anadromous Fish Water Management Committee) was formed in 1991 to 
study water rentals for flow augmentation. The group includes Reclamation, Idaho 
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Department of Water Resources, Idaho Department of Fish and Game, Bonneville Power 
Administration, Nez Perce and Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, irrigators, and Idaho Power 
Company (SOR, Main, 10-7). The group has provided a forum for addressing issues 
related to rentals and releases of water for salmon recovery. 
The Bureau of Reclamation, the States of Idaho and Oregon, BP A, NWPPC, and 
other parties formed the Snake River Basin Water Committee in 1992 (SOR, Main, 10-7). 
The committee was asked to consider how an additional 1 maf could be obtained from the 
Snake River Basin, and water transfers are among the options they have studied. 
The transfer of unassigned storage and rental of surplus water for flow 
augmentation in Idaho has been controversial and highlights conflicts between state water 
law, local priorities, and regional plans. In order to use stored water for salmon flows, 
Reclamation has filed change of use applications with the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources (IDWR). Under Idaho law, such applications must be approved by the state 
legislature before taking effect. In order for such a change to be approved, flow 
augmentation would need to be recognized as a beneficial use. The Idaho legislature has 
been reluctant to include flows for salmon recovery in the definition of beneficial use. 
The State has so far granted only temporary authority for flow augmentation while 
refusing to approve Reclamation's application for change of use or include flow 
augmentation as a beneficial use. When Reclamation filed again for change of use in 
1995, about 80 protests were made to the IDWR. Reclamation and the other parties 
reached a negotiated settlement that became the basis for legislation submitted to the 
Idaho Legislature in 1996 (SOR, Main, 10-7). 
As passed by the legislature, temporary authority has been extended through the 
1999 water season for release of a maximum 4 2 7 kaf per year. The law (Idaho Code, 
Chapter 17, Title 42, Section 42-1763B) further holds that: 
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to ... constitute a finding by the 
legislature that the rental or use of storage water for augmentation of flows for 
salmon migration is a beneficial use of water, [or] that it is in the public interest ... 
The bill was accompanied by a concurrent resolution (HCR 037) that states that Idaho 
does not recognize the concept of flow augmentation or reservoir drawdown as valid for 
recovery of snake river salmon, and does not support these measures as long-term 
approaches to Snake River Basin management. The concerns of the state of Idaho as 
stated in HCR 3 7 include that, 11 ••• flow augmentations have had a documented negative 
effect on the communities, and on recreation, irrigation and transportation activities, all of 
which are vital to the stability and quality of life in Idaho. 11 All of this demonstrates that 
Idaho has been very active in asserting its control over State waters, and that it is 
concerned with impact on local communities and economies. 
Given that Idaho has the authority to control water transfers, and that state 
concerns are dominated by local impacts, what can be done to promote transfers that 
might be in the regional interest but are blocked by local concerns? If transfers are to be 
achieved without overriding state authority, mechanisms will need to be developed that 
ensure that benefits from trade flow back into Idaho, and that harm to local communities 
is mitigated or compensated. Evidence and information on the actual impact of transfers 
also needs to be compiled to counter fears that water transfers will mean the dismantling 
of the agricultural sector (Middaugh 1995). Water transfers target marginally productive 
land and water in marginally productive uses, and its impact will likely be felt at the 
margin rather than at the heart of the agricultural economy. 
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Winners and Losers 
One way to consider how transfers might be promoted is to examine who would 
stand to gain and who to lose from lessening restrictions on water transfers. The primary 
beneficiaries should be the immediate parties to a trade. If a trade is made between an 
irrigator and a power producer, it can be expected that the irrigator has gained more 
through trade than he would through growing crops, and that the power producer has 
gained a source of power that is less expensive than other alternatives. This is also a 
benefit for electricity consumers, because utility regulators generally require that such 
savings be passed on. If water is obtained for the purpose of salmon recovery, it is 
expected that the benefits to salmon are greater, or are obtained at a lower cost, than 
would be the case through alternative recovery measures. In many cases there may be 
multiple benefits from trade, as when increased flows benefit fish as well as power 
producers. 
All other things being equal, those who stand to gain from trade would be 
expected to promote it. However, even though a significant portion of water devoted to 
irrigation has relatively low expected returns, irrigators have generally opposed expanded 
transfers. Some reasons for this opposition have been explored, but its source can be 
summarized as risk aversion. Water transfers, even when carried out carefully and 
reviewed thoroughly, have the potential to harm other rights holders. There is also a fear 
that water traded today will not be available should it be needed tomorrow. Although 
water may have very low marginal value in terms of productivity, it may have a much 
higher value as a form of insurance. One way to promote and encourage transfers, then, 
is to reduce these sources of uncertainty. 
An example of this is provided by legislation authorizing the Snake River water 
bank. One of the fears regarding lease or rental of water by irrigators is that such water 
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may be subject to forfeiture. The enabling legislation provided that water leased through 
the bank would not be forfeited. This allows participation in the bank by irrigators who 
might otherwise have no use for a portion of their water but still be unwilling to rent or 
lease (Gardner 1987). 
Opposition to trade also comes from the broader community in the area where 
water originates. The secondary impacts of water transfers can harm those who supply 
irrigators and those who store, transport, and process agricultural commodities. 
Secondary effects can include an erosion of the tax base as wealth is transferred out of a 
community. In the case of Idaho, the importance of irrigated agriculture in the economy 
ensures a base of support for continued expansion of irrigated acreage, which in turn 
requires that sources of water for such expansion be defended. 
Other river users could certainly be affected by transfers, but it is unlikely that 
recreation or transportation benefits would provide a primary motive for water transfer. 
Rather, such interests may be harmed or promoted by transfers undertaken for other 
reasons. Such externalities, including benefit or harm to wildlife habitat, should be 
included in the evaluation of potential trades. Forcing external factors to be considered 
before water transfers are approved represents one legitimate role for public interest 
review provisions contained in many state water laws, including Idaho's. 
Salmon, electricity consumers, and individual irrigators are all potential 
beneficiaries of water transfers. Irrigators, agricultural communities, and the broader 
agricultural economy are perhaps most likely to suffer. Even if there is a social benefit in 
facilitating a water transfer, localized opposition can prevent most transfers from taking 
place. A good deal of opposition to water transfers is related to uncertainty surrounding 
their effects. Measures intended to promote water transfers will need to ensure that 
irrigators and agricultural communities are treated fairly, as well as reducing the 
uncertainty surrounding the water transfer process. To a large extent, the only way to 
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address uncertainty is through experience. As Zach Willey of the Environmental Defense 
Fund suggests, "What we really need is to have some people try it out on a modest scale. 
We need to substitute some modest action for all the immodest rhetoric (Middaugh 
1995)." 
Promoting Water Transfers 
Two measures are needed if voluntary water transfers are to increase significantly 
in the Northwest. First, ground rules for market transactions need to be established. This 
is particularly important for transfers of water out of agricultural use or across state lines. 
Second, measures are needed to account for externalities associated with water transfers, 
to ensure that potential transfers are beneficial to the region as a whole and not just to the 
parties involved in the transaction. 
Secure Rights for All Water Users 
In order to resolve legal ambiguities over the status of water rights held by various 
parties, the rights of the various water users need to be more clearly defined. This is 
particularly true with respect to water rights to minimum flows for power production, fish 
habitat, or other instream use. As currently defined, power producers may have flows 
reduced at any time by new claims for irrigation. Butcher, Wandschneider, and 
Whittlesey (1986) conclude that minimum rights to flows for hydropower production 
need to be established as a base on which market transactions can be conducted. Without 
a base right to minimum flows, there is no incentive for the power system to pursue 
market trades in water, because any water obtained can be claimed again for irrigation. 
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Without a base right, there is no guarantee that water obtained will actually increase the 
overall flow available for power production, fish habitat, or other uses. 
While such a step may be necessary, the authors also note that any attempt to end 
subordination of hydropower rights would raise a great number of legal issues, and 
sorting them out would require "an almost universal adjudication" of water rights in the 
Basin (Butcher, Wandschneider, and Whittlesey 1986, 61). The relative priority ofrights 
may be thrown into question as some irrigators find their rights suddenly junior to 
previously subordinate hydropower flows. If water transfers are to succeed, however, 
some means must be provided to ensure that water actually goes to the intended purpose. 
Because many rivers are overappropriated, junior water rights holders may absorb water 
purchased for instream flows (Middaugh 1995). This is particularly likely in dry years, 
when the water is most needed for instream use. 
Another reform suggested by Butcher, Wandschneider, and Whittlesey is the 
establishment of basin-wide water rights that would be recognized by all states and be 
transferable across state lines. This would greatly facilitate water transfers, but would 
require states to give up some of their control over water resources. In the absence of 
cooperative state action, however, interstate conflict that arise over water use will 
ultimately be settled by the courts. The courts will be the ultimate arbiter in conflicts 
between state and federal authority as well unless legislative and/or administrative 
agreements can be established to govern conflicts between various uses (including fish 
habitat). Creation of a Columbia interstate compact has been the subject of discussion 
for many years, and could serve as the basis for establishing interstate water rights. 
Barriers to freely functioning water markets are substantial. The lack of secure, 
well defined rights that are recognized within and between states and that are integrated 
with federal mandates and authority is a real obstacle to trade. Establishment of a 
consistent regional structure, combined with reform in state water laws to facilitate 
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transfers, especially transfers between different uses, would seem to be necessary if water 
use is to be made more efficient and management of the system more flexible. 
Externalities and Equity 
Idaho serves as a good example of the potential divergence between the interests 
of a particular state and those of the region as a whole. From the perspective of the State 
of Idaho, water transfers can undermine the state's economic base. The state's goal is to 
ensure a relatively stable, predictable supply of water to agriculture in the face of a river 
that is fully appropriated, at least in relatively dry years. Any water that is transferred to 
enhance flows is viewed as water that provides little or no economic return, at least 
within the state. To the extent that it does benefit salmon, runs would not be expected to 
support a commercial or sports fishery for many years. And even if salmon runs were to 
rebound significantly, this would have little impact in the southern part of the state, as 
salmon habitat above Hell's Canyon has been blocked by dams. The tangible benefit to 
the state from increased flows is power production, and even here much of the benefit is 
produced at federal dams downstream from the Idaho border. 
One mechanism available to the state to retain some of the benefits from transfers 
is taxation. An excise tax on water transactions, for example, would generate revenue to 
help offset the adverse impact of water transfers. Revenues could be used for economic 
development, or to support development and dissemination of water conservation 
programs that focus on decreasing crop consumptive use. Such revenues would assist in 
making the transition to a less water-intensive agricultural economy. 
The impact of liberalized water transfers on Idaho's economy and that of other 
states in the region may not be substantial. To begin with, sales or rentals of water will 
not occur unless the expected gain from trade is at least as large as the expected income 
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from crop production. The cost of 1 maf of water for water year 1987 in 1994 dollars at a 
market clearing price would have been approximately $34 million, while the lost 
producer profit from the transfer would have totaled just under $23 million (Diamant and 
Willey 1995). The net gain in income would have been $11 million, a gain of almost 
50% over the expected crop income. Attempting to predict the price that would prevail in 
a market or the quantity that would be traded is beyond the scope of this paper, but such 
trades should result in a net increase in agricultural income. If such income is reinvested, 
it should also strengthen the overall agricultural economy even at the expense of a 
marginal decrease in total agricultural output. 
There is reason, however, for Idaho and other states to be concerned about 
protecting the public interest in water transfers. Transferring water has a real potential to 
create externalities, effects that may appear as direct costs to other irrigators or as damage 
to wildlife habitat, recreation opportunities, or other public goods. Provisions in water 
law to protect the public interest should account for such direct effects as real costs of 
water transfers, but should distinguish such direct effects from potential secondary 
impacts. Water transfers are likely to cause some localized declines in the agricultural 
economy through secondary, or ripple, effects. Such declines should be offset by benefits 
in the area(s) to which water is transferred, but the local economic activity may or may 
not be replaced by other business. The standard for approval of water transfers should 
not require that there be no negative secondary impacts, as such a standard would 
preclude almost any shift in the structure or location of economic activity. Rather, the 
goal of the state might best be to assist local areas with economic transition and 
development, a goal that could be served by allowing water to seek its highest return and 
ensuring that some of that return is reinvested in the area of origin (National Research 
Council 1992, 45-50). The alternative is to wait while pressure on resources continues to 
increase, leading to political and possibly legal conflict and the costs such conflict entails. 
Models for Water Resource Acquisition 
Specific opportunities for water transfers in the Columbia Basin have been 
identified and models for resource acquisition suggested. Below are described three 
qualitative examples of how water markets might function in the Northwest. 
Contingent marketing 
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The dependability of water supply is a crucial variable for irrigators when making 
the decision to invest in agricultural development. Competition for water resources 
reaches its height in dry years, when less water is available for all users. Contingent 
water marketing has been suggested as a potential mechanism to facilitate water transfers 
while limiting their impact on agriculture (Hamilton, Whittlesey, and Halverson 1989; 
Huffaker, Whittlesey, and Wandschneider 1993). The appeal of this proposal is its 
recognition that in wet years, the marginal value of water is higher in agriculture, while in 
dry years, the value is greater for power production, and perhaps for fish habitat as well. 
In contingent marketing, irrigators enter into contracts with power producers or with 
federal or regional entities responsible for both salmon protection and power production. 
The contracts would allow irrigators use of water unless flows in the river drop below a 
specified level. In such years, contract holders would be required to reduce their water 
use in proportion to the size of the flow deficit. In Whittlesey and Hamilton's proposal, 
irrigators would be required to reduce consumptive use by a maximum 50%. Based on 
historic water flow, their proposal would require transfers in eight out of fifty years. In 
this scenario, irrigators would be paid more than the expected value of water to them 
when transfers are made, but would retain use of the water in most years. Such a system 
retains a relatively stable and predictable water supply for irrigators while allowing 
transfers of water to other uses when its value in those uses is highest. 
Water repurchase from high lift irrigation 
The Columbia Basin Project serves as a good example of high-lift irrigation. 
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Approximately 1 maf of water are used to irrigate over 555,000 acres in the Project in 
Washington State. Water for the project is pumped from Lake Roosevelt and is applied 
primarily through center pivot irrigation systems. Pumping water and pressurizing such 
systems requires a great deal of electricity. As calculated above, the subsidy to irrigators 
in the Project is approximately $23 million per year. The opportunity cost from foregone 
power production adds an additional $12-$26 million annually to the social cost of 
irrigation in the project. The marginal value of water for production in the Project has not 
been estimated, but there is indirect evidence that it is in fact close to zero at the point of 
diversion, consistent with the value that would be predicted (Butcher, Wandschneider, 
and Whittlesey 1986). Thus there should be ample opportunity for productive trade of 
water from irrigation to power production. 
The ideal remedy for the inefficient use of water induced by subsidies would be to 
charge irrigators the full cost of power they consume. There are substantial legal and 
political barriers to such a change. Congress refused to even study such a change in 
1982, although it did add provisions requiring farms over 960 acres to pay full cost of 
power used on those additional acres (Wahl 1989). This provision has little effect 
because land owners can and do divide their holdings to avoid paying such costs. There 
appears to be little prospect that such subsidies will end in the near term. 
As Wahl points out, however, allowing water to be traded will cause irrigators to 
value water at its market price rather than at its marginal cost to them. Irrigators would 
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thus be expected to sell any quantity of water that is worth less to them than its price in 
the market. Thus trades can lead to the same outcome as eliminating subsidies in terms 
of how resources are distributed. The primary difference is that where trading is 
instituted, the value of subsidies accrues to the irrigators rather than being returned to 
society. In the past, the Bureau of Reclamation has refused to allow sales or rentals of 
water from federal projects at any price higher than the cost of providing the water. This 
restriction was intended to prevent irrigators from profiting on federally provided water. 
Reclamation has since begun to allow such profits consistent with its stated principles on 
voluntary water transfers (U.S. Department of the Interior 1988). 
Transferring water from irrigation to power production would be beneficial up the 
point where the marginal values of water in both uses are equal. Such a trade might also 
make more water available to increase flows for salmon on the main stem of the 
Columbia. In order for trading to take place, it would need to be consistent with the laws 
of the State of Washington and with the policies of the Bureau of Reclamation. It is an 
open question how the state might view a proposal to sell or rent water from the Project, 
but if flexible management of water in the Basin and reallocation of water is a goal, such 
opportunities for transfer should be pursued. 
Water Banking 
One of the difficulties involved in water transfers is the need to track flows and 
water quantities as they are moved. Water banking facilitates transactions by providing a 
central exchange for small deposits and withdrawals. The Upper Snake River Water 
Bank is an example of the potential advantages of such an arrangement. While limits are 
placed by the State of Idaho on transfers of water, the bank nonetheless serves as useful 
mechanism for transferring water within the state. An interstate water bank would 
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provide a means of bringing together buyers and sellers and could also help in 
determining the market value of water. Disparities in power and information between 
buyers and sellers might otherwise lead to wide variations in the price of water and 
potential for very large purchasers such as BP A to set the market. A system of banks 
allowing storage at various locations would facilitate trade and put transactions on more 
even terms. 
Setting Priorities: Cost-Effective Management and Regional Reform 
Specific goals for public policy emerge from the political process. That process is 
one of competition and attrition between conflicting goals and ideas. Once a particular 
goal is chosen, however, there can be a great deal of difficulty implementing a program to 
achieve it. There is a strong current in contemporary political life that pushes for cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) of every program, to ensure that it will have a net benefit. 
However, CBA is not always possible, nor is it always desirable. In the case of water 
transfers in the Columbia Basin, economist Norm Whittlesey has pointed out that CBA is 
not possible because the value of salmon protection is not amenable to economic 
quantification (Whittlesey 1992). In such a situation, the best approach is to seek cost-
effective policies that achieve a desired result at the least cost. 
The Northwest is facing a battle over how to fund salmon restoration measures. 
While the Northwest Power Act mandates that beneficiaries of the federal power system 
share in the cost of programs to mitigate impacts on fish and wildlife, in practice BP A has 
been responsible for most of those costs. Financial pressures on BP A in the form of 
increased competition and debt load from failed WPPSS investments have caused BP A to 
search for ways to increase revenues and limit costs. A call has come from BP A and 
from many of BP A's customers for a cap on the agency's liability for salmon protection. 
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Of particular concern to BP A is the loss of revenue when water is released for fish rather 
than stored for power generation, especially since that loss could soar in dry years when 
most of the available water may be needed for fish. 
BP A has chosen to focus on controlling costs related to salmon protection as a 
means of ensuring its financial solvency. Salmon restoration is a relatively new cost that 
has grown rapidly, and debate about how to protect the salmon has been very visible. 
Salmon protection, however, is one of many activities that affect operation of the power 
system and that impose limits on BP A's ability to maximize power revenues. Among the 
foremost factors affecting power revenues are the absence of any right to minimum flows 
for power production and the lack of federal or regional authority to allocate water or 
control withdrawals. Rather than blaming the cost of salmon protection for BP A's 
difficulties, all of the factors that impose limitations on power production should be 
examined together. Opportunity costs are imposed not only when water is released for 
salmon, but also whenever water is withdrawn or used in any manner that competes with 
power production. Costs imposed to protect salmon appear more controversial than costs 
imposed by other activities simply because they are the most recent. Focusing on salmon 
has put BP A in a position of counting water allocated to fish as a cost, while the cost of 
allocating water to irrigation is ignored. 
The need to protect salmon while ensuring that BP A can remain competitive and 
meet its financial obligations has focused attention on system efficiency. If the Columbia 
Basin is to be managed efficiently, authority over river operations and authority over 
water allocation need to be combined. Regional cooperation on basin management 
without regional cooperation on water allocation makes achievement of basin-wide goals 
difficult if not impossible. The legal and institutional structures that control water 
allocation, however, present significant obstacles to reform. Those structures are rooted 
in a past where the value of water lay in diversion and consumption rather than instream 
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use. Although the social calculus of water values has shifted as water use has intensified, 
the system of water allocations has not changed to reflect those new values. Because 
water is very valuable, especially where it is scarce, those who benefit from current 
allocations resist change, and states that depend on water for economic activity are loathe 
to relinquish any control. The fact that benefits from the current pattern of water use are 
concentrated among individuals who have appropriated water for private gain, while 
benefits from more efficient use would be dispersed among the many electricity 
consumers and residents of the Northwest makes it difficult to mobilize a constituency to 
press for change. Expansion of regional authority over river operations combined with 
legal and political pressure for salmon protection may combine to overcome the present 
inertia and force changes in the system of water allocation. 
The key to forcing change in water law may lie in fostering unlikely coalitions 
between residential power consumers, industrial power customers, environmental 
interests, and even irrigators themselves. All have something to gain from liberalization 
of trade in water rights. Moreover, if irrigators are not allowed to trade water rights more 
freely, they may find their rights constricted or lost to court-imposed systems of water 
allocation and management. This prospect could provide great motivation for change. 
The danger is that irrigators and states may continue to believe that such a reckoning can 
be put off indefinitely, ultimately leading to greater conflict. 
The fear of change, to be expected from both current beneficiaries of water rights 
and from the states themselves, may be a greater impediment to water transfers than the 
actual impact that would be felt from liberalization of water law. Many of the benefits of 
water transfers would be shared through the region, while the costs might be more 
concentrated in certain states or localities. States, and possibly regional authorities, can 
take measures to compensate for negative impacts, and systems such as contingent 
marketing could allow benefits to be captured at little expense to agriculture. Rather than 
allowing the potential costs of water transfers to prevent marginal changes in water 
allocation and use, the region should seek means of easing the transition in areas most 
likely to suffer some economic decline. 
57 
In summary, social, environmental, and economic goals can best be served by 
creation of a flexible system of water management and allocation. The ability to shift 
water between uses would allow water to flow to where it is most valued at a given time. 
The relative value of water changes, not only over time but also from year to year 
depending on annual precipitation. A regulated but consistent and predictable water 
market would allow both long and short te:gn gains. The BP A should not be limited in its 
search for greater efficiency and low-cost power by archaic systems of water allocation. 
Neither should regional plans for salmon protection be prevented from pursuing the most 
cost-effective management options. The lack of flexibility in the system of water rights 
as currently administered prevents such goals from being achieved. 
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